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I am an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics of the Athens University of Economics and Business. My primary focus is Microeconomic Theory. I have published papers on such topics as Mechanism Design, Social Choice and Normative Ethics.

Recent Publications

 
We discuss the problem of choosing between two public alternatives under the assumption that preferences are quasilinear. We concentrate on the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are not dominated by another strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanism. We characterize the class of Undominated mechanisms that exhibit a minimal degree of impartiality toward the two alternatives and that do not allow for positive transfers to agents whose preferred alternative is selected. The novelty of the solution we propose lies in the fact that it affords the mechanism designer multiple ways to resolve the issue of the public decision and uniquely determines the design of transfers based on this choice.

Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms

earlier version

accepted at the Journal of Economic Theory (September 2021)

 
We discuss the pure public good problem in economies involving two agents, under the assumption that preferences are quasilinear. We characterize the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are not dominated by another strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanism. The Pivotal mecha- nism is the only undominated mechanism that also maximizes the total surplus. A family of mechanisms featuring unanimous decision making comprises all the undominated mechanisms satisfying no-envy. In addition, this same family com- prises all the undominated mechanisms that always balance the budget.

Working Papers

 
Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order tocommunicate they need to have a language in common. Learning languages is costly.Our focus is on environments comprising a large number of agents. In this setting wediscuss mechanisms that each satisfies three of the following requirements: AssignmentEfficiency, Strategy-Proofness, Individual Rationality and Feasibility. We propose threemechanisms. Each of them, although arguably best in its class, comes short of consti-tuting a viable policy recommendation. Nonetheless, we find that there is some roomfor public intervention when large economies are involved. This crucially relies eitheron the capacity of the planner to finance language acquisition, or on the fact that allindividuals attach a positive value, even if minimal, to the possibility of communicating.

We discuss the problem of choosing between two public alternatives un- der the assumption that preferences are quasi-linear and that one of the two alternatives represents the status quo. We characterize the class of strategy-proof and feasible mechanisms satisfying Voluntary Participation. Subsequently, we show that the Unanimity mechanism dominates all the members of this class. Moreover, within this class, it is the only mechanism that is not dominated by another strategy-proof and feasible mechanism.

“My definition of an intellectual is someone who can listen to the William Tell Overture without thinking of the Lone Ranger.”

— Billy Connolly.